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SIXTH AMENDMENT-PRETRIAL IDENTIFICATION AND THE RIGHT TO
COUNSEL
Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977).
In Moore v. Illinois,' the United States Supreme
Court clarified its position as to when the sixth
amendment entitles the accused to the assistance
of counsel at a pretrial corporeal identification and
as to when testimony concerning the pretrial iden-
tification of an uncounseled accused is admissible
at trial. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Powell,
held that the sixth amendment's counsel guarantee
attaches upon the initiation of the adversary crim-
inal proceedings, even if, as in Moore, the pretrial
corporeal identification occurs at a preliminary
hearing, prior to the accused's indictment.2 The
Court also held that prosecution testimony con-
cerning a pretrial identification improperly con-
ducted in the absence of counsel is inadmissible at
trial even if an independent source for the pretrial
identification can be established.
3
The sixth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution entitles the accused to the assistance of
counsel in all criminal prosecutions.4 Historically,
the counsel guarantee was intended to assure the
assistance of counsel at trial, inasmuch as the ac-
cused there became "confronted with both the
intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the
public prosecutor."5 However, as a result of
changes in patterns of investigation and procedure,
today's accused confronts both expert adversaries
and the judicial system well before his trial begins.6
It is therefore appropriate that the counsel guar-
antee has been extended to critical stages of pros-
ecution which precede trial.7
434 U.S. 220 (1977).2 Id. at 228-29.
3 Id. at 231-32.
" U.S. CONsr. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence."
5 United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973).6 id. at 310.
7 As the Supreme Court has noted:
When the Bill of Rights was adopted, there were
no organized police forces as we know them today.
The accused confronted the prosecutor and the
witnesses against him, and the evidence was mar-
shalled, largely at the trial itself. In contrast, today's
law enforcement machinery involves critical con-
frontations of the accused by the prosecution at
pretrial proceedings where the results might well
In United States v. Wade,8 the Supreme Court held
that a pretrial post-indictment identification
lineup is a critical stage of prosecution at which the
accused is entitled to the assistance of counsel. In
Wade, the Court determined that the presence of
counsel is necessary both to prevent suggestiveness
in the conduct of the lineup and to permit recon-
struction of the event for effective cross-examina-
tion at trial-in short, to assure a meaningful
defense? Realizing that a witness is unlikely to
change an announced identification, the Court
emphasized the necessity of preventing the im-
settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to
a mere formality. In recognition of these realities of
modem criminal prosecution, our cases have con-
strued the Sixth Amendment guarantee to apply to
"critical" stages of the proceedings.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,224 (1967) (footnote
omitted).
Pretrial confrontations deemed "critical" stages of the
proceedings include arraignment, Hamilton v. Alabama,
368 U.S. 52 (1961), post-indictment lineup, United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 52 (1967), and preliminary hearing,
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
8 388 U.S. 218 (1967). In this case, defendant Wade
was indicted for the robbery of a federally insured bank.
A lineup for identification purposes was then conducted
in the absence of Wade's appointed counsel. Each partic-
ipant in the lineup wore strips of tape on his face and
spoke words attributed to the robber. The witnesses
identified Wade as the robber and, at trial, testified that
Wade was the robber. Testimony regarding the pretrial
identifications was elicited by defense counsel on cross-
examination.
9
id. at 224-25, 236. It is this dual purpose of the
counsel guarantee that precludes the application of the
"totality of circumstances" test suggested by Justice
Rehnquist in Moore. 434 U.S. at 233 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring). If the counsel guarantee were intended only
to prevent suggestiveness and thus ensure the reliability
of pretrial identifications, perhaps the "totality" test
employed to determine due process violations would be
appropriate to determine whether the presence ofcounsel
was necessary in a given situation. However, it is because
of the harmful impact of a pretrial denial of counsel upon
the trial itself that counsel is guaranteed to the defendant
at "citical" pretrial stages and that any testimony ex-
ploiting the denial must be strictly excluded by the trial
court. Whether the right to counsel attaches and whether
exploitive testimony is admissible cannot be determined
on a case by case basis according to the "totality of
circumstances" of each case.
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proper suggestions that often lead to mistaken
identifications.' 0 Moreover, recognizing that a pre-
trial confrontation for purposes of identification"
may in effect be the trial that determines the fate
of the accused, 2 the Court extended the right of
counsel to protect the accused from prejudice at
this critical stage in the prosecution.
Since the conduct of a pretrial post-indictment
lineup in the absence of defense counsel was held
to have violated the accused's sixth amendment
right to counsel, thare arose, in Wade, a corollary
question regarding the admissibility of identifica-
tions made at trial by witnesses who had attended
constitutionally impermissible pretrial lineups.
These in-court identifications, the Court held, must
be excluded at trial unless the prosecution can
establish that the identifications are based on ob-
servations of the accused other than those made at
the lineup.'3
In Gilbert v. Califomia,'4 a companion case to
Wade, the Supreme Court reiterated its Wade hold-
ing that the conduct of a pretrial post-indictment
lineup in the absence of defense counsel is uncon-
stitutional and that the admission of in-court iden-
tifications, without first determining that they are
untainted by an illegal lineup, is constitutional
error. In addition, the Gilbert Court addressed the
0 388 U.S. at 229.
" "The pre-trial confrontation for purpose of identifi-
cation may take the form of a lineup ... or presentation
of the suspect alone to the witness .... It is obvious that
risks of suggestion attend either form of confrontation
and increase the dangers inhering in eyewitness identifi-
cation." Id
12 The trial which might determine the accused's
fate may well not be that in the courtroom but that
at the pretrial confrontation, with the State aligned
against the accused, the witness the sole.jury, and
the accused unprotected against the overreaching,
intentional or unintentional, and with little or no
effective appeal from the judgment there rendered
by the witness-"that's the man."
/, at 235-36.
13Id. at 239-40.
14 388 U.S. 263 (1967). In this case, defendant Gilbert
was indicted for armed robbery and murder, and a lineup
was conducted in the absence of Gilbert's appointed
counsel. The lineup was held in an auditorium so that
over 100 persons could view the lineup participants, who
were instructed to walk, speak and don certain clothing.
At trial, the eyewitnesses to the crime in question iden-
tified Gilbert as the robber-murderer. Testimony regard-
ing their pretrial identifications was elicited by -defense
counsel on cross-examination. On direct examination by
the prosecution, the manager of the building where Gil-
bert lived and eight witnesses to other robberies attrib-
uted to Gilbert identified Gilbert in court and testified to
their pretrial identifications.
issue of the admissibility of direct testimony by
prosecution witnesses concerning improper pretrial
identifications. On this point, the Court held that
testimony derived from improper pretrial identifi-
cations is exploitive of illegal lineups and must
therefore be excluded, even if an independent
source for the pretrial identifications can be as-
serted.' s The per se exclusion of such testimony, the
Court reasoned, is necessary so as not to enhance
in-court identifications and thereby "seriously ag-
gravate whatever derogation exists of the accused's
right to a fair trial.' Furthermore, the Court
believed that "[o]nly a per se exclusionary rule as to
such testimony can be an effective sanction to
assure that law enforcement authorities will respect
the accused's constitutional right to the presence of
counsel at the critical lineup."'17 The Court found
the admission of testimony concerning improper
pretrial identifications to be constitutional error in
Gilbert, but left to the courts below the determina-
tion of whether the error was harmless.
8
In Kirby v. Illinois,"9 the Supreme Court addressed
the 'question of an accused's entitlement to the
assistance of counsel at a pretrial pre-indictment iden-
tification. The Court held that a person's consti-
tutional right to counsel attaches only "at or after
the initiation of adversary judicial criminal pro-
ceedings-whether by way of formal charge, pre-
liminary hearing, indictment, information, or ar-
raignment."'20 Since no prosecution had com-
menced against Kirby prior to his being identified
by the victim, the Court found no right to the
assistance of counsel at the confrontation. Inas-
much as the pretrial identification was not im-
proper, the Court declined to apply the Wade-
"s Id. at 272-73.
'6 1d. at 273-74.
Id. at 273.
18 Id at 274. According to Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18 (1967), the harmlessness of a constitutional error
must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. If there
is no "reasonable possibility that the evidence complained
of might have contributed to the conviction," the error
will be deemed harmless. Fahey v. Connecticut, 375 U.S.
85, 86-87 (1963).
is 406 U.S. 682 (1972). In this case, the police stopped
defendant Kirby on the street and found him to be
carrying someone else's social security card and traveler's
checks. Kirby was arrested and brought to the police
station. When police records revealed the items in ques-
tion to have been recently stolen, the police brought the
robbery victim to the police station and the victim iden-
tified Kirby as the robber. At trial, the victim again





Gilbert principles to exclude any of the victim's
identification testimony.
2'
In Moore v. Illinois,22 the Supreme Court once
again concerned itself with the propriety of a pre-
trial corporeal identification. Defendant Moore
was implicated in the sexual assault of a young
woman23 by the victim's identification of Moore's
photograph 24 and by the presence at the scene of
the crime of a letter written by Moore's girlfriend.25
Upon this evidence, the police arrested Moore and
held him pending a preliminary hearing to deter-
mine whether he should be bound over to the
grand jury.
26
As the victim was escorted to the preliminary
hearing, a policeman told her that she was going
to view a suspect whom she should identify if she
could. The policeman also had the victim sign a
complaint which named Moore as her assailant. At
the hearing, the victim was in the courtroom when
Moore's name was called and he was led to the
bench. After the judge informed Moore that he
was charged with rape and deviate sexual assault,
and after the judge called the victim to the bench,
the State's Attorney enumerated the items of phys-
ical evidence linking Moore to the crimes.27 The
21 Id. at 690.
22 434 U.S. 220 (1977).
23 The victim was sexually assaulted in her apartment
at mid-day. The victim saw her assailant's face for ten to
fifteen seconds before he covered it with a bandana.
Although she did not know his name, the victim thought
her assailant was the same man who had made offensive
remarks to her in a bar the night before. Id. at 221-22.
24 According to the United States Supreme Court, the
victim chose two or three photographs, one of which
pictured Moore. 434 U.S. at 222. According to the Illinois
Supreme Court, the victim tentatively identified Moore
from his photograph but stated that she could not be
certain unless she saw him again. People v. Moore, 51 Ill.
2d 79, 85, 281 N.E.2d 294, 298 (1972). Both the Illinois
Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit considered the photographic iden-
tification to form the basis of the victim's subsequent
cororeal identifications of Moore. See notes 41 & 53 infra.
434 U.S. at 222.
26 In Illinois, all prosecutions of felonies must be by
indictment unless properly waived. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch..
38, § 11 1-2(a) (Smith-Hurd 1970). A preliminary hearing
may be held to determine if there is probable cause to
believe that the defendant has committed an offense and
should therefore be held to answer to the grand jury. ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 109-3(a) (Smith-Hurd 1970).
2 The State's Attorney stated that a guitar and a flute
taken from the victim's apartment at the time of the
assault were found in Moore's apartment. He also stated
that clothes like those worn by the assailant were found
in Moore's apartment. However, since further investiga-
tion revealed that the instruments found at Moore's
State's Attorney tlen asked the victim if she saw
her assailant in the courtroom, whereupon the
victim pointed to Moore.28 Moore was neither rep-
resented by counsel at this hearing nor offered an
appointment of counsel by the court.29
After the grand jury returned a four-count in-
dictment against Moore,30 an attorney was ap-
pointed to defend him. Citing Wade, Moore's coun-
sel moved to suppress the victim's identification of
Moore, alleging that it had been elicited through
an unnecessarily suggestive pretrial procedure at
which Moore had been without counsel. After an
evidentiary hearing, the court denied the motion
to suppress the victim's identification, on grounds
that the prosecution had shown an independent
basis for the identification.
3
1
At trial, the victim testified on direct examina-
tion by the prosecution that she had identified
Moore at the preliminary hearing, and she once
again identified Moore as her assailant. The jury
found Moore guilty as charged.32 On appeal, the
Illinois Supreme Court rejected Moore's argument
that the victim's identification testimony should
have been excluded as the product of a "suggestive
corporeal identification procedure. ' ' 3 The court
believed that the fact that the victim had been
permitted to see Moore at the preliminary hearing
had merely confirmed her identification from a
proper photographic display and had not tainted
her identification.3
apartment were not those taken from the victim's apart-
ment, the instruments were not introduced into evidence
at trial, nor was any clothing. 434 U.S. at 230 n.4.
2 Id. at 222-23.
2 Moore's preliminary hearing was held in 1967. Since
1970, individuals accused of crime in Illinois have been
entitled to the assistance of counsel at preliminary hear-
ings. People v. Adams, 46 11. 2d 200, 263 N.E.2d 490
-(1970), aff'd sub nora. Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278
(1972).
3o Moore was indicted for rape, deviate sexual assault,
burglary and robbery. 434 U.S. at 223.
31 Id.
3 Id. at 223-24. In addition to the victim's identifica-
tion, the prosecution presented the letter found in the
victim's apartment as evidence linking Moore to the
crimes. The defense presented an alibi for the time of the
assault and a theory that the victim had brought the
letter from the bar to her apartment the night before the
attack. The jury rejected both the defense theory and
alibi.
33 51111. 2d at 84, 281 N.E.2d at 297. The court found
no reversible error in any of the nine claims asserted by
Moore.
3' The court found no error in permitting the victim to
see the defendant at the preliminary hearing under the
drcumstances. Id at 85-86, 281 N.E.2d at 298. The relevant
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After the United States Supreme Court denied
certioraris Moore sought a writ of habeas corpus
from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, alleging violation of
his sixth amendment rights.t 6 The district court
declined to decide the question of whether Moore
had been entitled to the assistance of counsel at the
pre-indictment identification3 7 Rather, the court
held that, even if the counsel guarantee and at-
tendant exclusionary rules were applicable in
Moore's case, the victim's identification testimony
was admissible because it had been based on ade-
quate observation of Moore at the time of the
assault.?8
The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial
of Moore's habeas corpus petition.t a The court held
that Moore's right to counsel had not been violated
at the pretrial pre-indictment corporeal identifica-
tion because Kirby had limited that right to post-
indictment situations." The court also held that
the Wade-Gilbert exclusionary rule was inapplicable
in Moore's situation because the victim's pretrial
identification had been of independent origin.
The United States Supreme Court finally
granted certiorari because of a conflict between the
holdings of the lower courts in Moore and the
circumstances were that the victim had tentatively iden-
tified the defendant from photographs but stated that
she could not be certain unless she saw him again. The
victim signed a criminal complaint naming the defend-
ant, then identified the defendant as her assailant, after
the defendant had been called before the bench for a
preliminary hearing. Id. at 85, 281 N.E.2d at 298. It is
interesting to note that the United States Supreme Court
considered these circumstances to be highly suggestive.
Se note 49 and accompanying text infia.
"409 US. 979 (1972).
United States ex rel Moore v. Illinois, No. 73-C-2222
(N.D. Ill. June 3, 1975). Moore contended that the
pretrial identification procedure was highly suggestive
and resulted in violations of his due process and sixth
amendment rights. Moore also contended that he was
denied due process and the effective assistance of counsel
when he was denied copies of the transcripts of pretrial
hearings which contained testimony by the victim. I.,
slip op. at 2. The Supreme Court addressed only Moore's
Gilbert argument, leaving the lower courts free to recon-
sider the other issues raised by Moore. 434 U.S. at 232
& n.7.
'
7 United States ex reL Moore v. Illinois, No. 75-1697
(7th Cir. April 27, 1976).
Id See note 53 spra.
reUnited States w refL Moore v. Illinois, No. 75-1697
(th Cir. April 27, 1976).
1, slip op. at 9.
4 rd slip op. at 8. See note 24 supra.
Court's holdings in Wade, Gilbert and Kirby.42 As a
consequence, the Court began its opinion in Moore
by reiterating its holdings in those earlier cases.43
The Court then addressed Moore's claim of enti-
tlement, under Wade, Gilbert and Kirby, to the as-
sistance of counsel at a pretrial pre-indictment cor-
poreal identification." The Court noted that Wade
and Gilbert had deemed the pretrial post-indictment
identification to be a critical prosecutive stage at
which the accused is entitled to the assistance of
counsel.
In addition, the Court noted that the question
of whether the accused is so entitled at pretrial pre-
indictment identifications had been answered by the
Court in Kirby when it held that an accused's right
to counsel attaches "at or after the initiation of
adversary judicial criminal proceedings-whether
by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indict-
ment, information, or arraignment."" Since the
Court had, in Kirby, specifically enumerated the
preliminary hearing as marking the initiation of
adversary judicial criminal proceedings, and since
the State of Illinois had conceded that the prelim-
inary hearing marked the initiation of adversary
judicial criminal proceedings against Moore, the
Court felt compelled, in Moore, to hold that Moore's
right to counsel had already attached prior to his
identification by the victim at the preliminary
hearing' In so holding, the Court rejected as
erroneous the Seventh Circuit's view that Kirby
entitled the accused to counsel only at post-indict-
ment identifications.48 The Court also rejected the
Seventh Circuit's implication that conduct of
Moore's identification at a judicial proceeding
rather than at a lineup somehow precluded his
right to counsel, for the Court found the 'judicial"
presentation to have been highly suggestive none-
theless.49 Noting the role of counsel in preventing
42434 U.S. at 221.
'3 For a discussion of the holdings of Wade, Gilbert and
Kirby, see notes 8-22 and accompanying text supra.
"Petitioner was entitled to have an attorney present
at his preliminary hearing, because it was a critical stage
of prosecution, at which Moore was confronted by the
onl, adversarial eyewitness." Brief for Petitioner at 13.
406 U.S. at 689 (emphasis added).
46434 U.S. at 228 (citing Brief for Respondent at 8 &
n.1; Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, 34).
4434 U.S. at 228-29.
48 Id at 228.
49 As the Court noted:
It is difficult to imagine a more suggestive man-
ner in which to present a suspect to a witness for
their critical first confrontation than was employed
in this case. The victim, who had seen her assailant
for only 10 to 15 seconds, was asked to make her
identification after she was told that she was going
19781
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suggestiveness in the conduct of a pretrial identi-
fication, the Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's
assertion that counsel would be of little use at a
pretrial identification such as Moore's.
5
0
The Court next addressed Moore's claim that
prosecution's testimony concerning the pretrial
identification should have been excluded by the
trial court.5 1 The Court held, as in Gilbert, that such
testimony was the direct result of an illegal identi-
fication procedure and had to be excluded regard-
less of the prosecution's establishment of an inde-
pendent source for the pretrial identification. 2
Thus, the courts below, which had held that the
victim's testimony concerning the pretrial identifi-
cation was admissible because of an independent
source for her identification,ss were found to have
been in error. In view of the violation of Moore's
right to counsel at the pretrial identification and
in view of the prosecution's exploitation at trial of
evidence directly derived from that violation, the
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Sev-
enth Circuit."' The cause was remanded for a
determination of whether the constitutional error
to view a suspect, after she was told his name and
heard it called as he was led before the bench, and
after she heard the prosecutor recite the evidence
believed to implicate the petitioner.
Id. at 229-30 (footnote omitted).
50 The Court enumerated several ways in which coun-
sel can attempt to prevent suggestiveness in a pretrial
identification such as Moore's. Counsel could request
arrangement of lineup, request to exclude the victim from
the courtroom while charges and evidence are recited,
request seating of the accused with the audience when
identification is attempted or cross-examine the victim
before her identification hardens. However, the Court
expressed no opinion as to whether the judge presiding
at the preliminary hearing must grant any of the above
requests. Id. at 230 & n.5.
, The Court did not pass on Moore's claims that the
victim's in-court identification was tainted by the prior
uncounseled identification or that the in-court-identifi-
cation should have been excluded under the due process
clause as the unreliable product of a suggestive procedure.
Id. at 232 n.7.
"
2Id. at 231.
53 The federal district court found the victim's identi-
fication of Moore to have derived from her observation
of him at the scene of the crime. United States ex rel.
Moore v. Illinois, No. 73-C-2222, slip op. at 12 (N.D. Ill.
June 3, 1975). The state supreme court found the victim's
identification of Moore to have derived from a proper
photographic identification. 51 Il1. 2d at 85-86, 281
N.E.2d at 298. The trial court admitted the victim's
identification on the ground that the prosecution had
shown an independent basis for the identification, 434
U.S. at 223, but it is not clear what the court considered
that basis to be.
54 434 U.S. at 231.
of admitting the tainted evidence had been harm-
less error.s5
In Moore, the Supreme Court clarified some con-
fusion which had arisen concerning its earlier hold-
ings in Wade, Gilbert and Kirby. The courts below
had apparently been confused about language in
earlier Supreme Court opinions regarding attach-
ment of the right to counsel-confusion which had
resulted in their misconstruing the substance of the
holdings of those cases. Undoubtedly, one such
misunderstanding arose because of Justice Stew-
art's framing of the counsel issue, in Kirby, in terms
of an extension of the benefits enjoyed by the
accused in post-indictment situations to pre-indict-
ment situations as well.56 In Kirby, the Court had
reviewed a lower court holding that the Wade-
Gilbert principles were inapplicable to pre-indictment
situations.5 7 The Supreme Court there affirmed the
lower court's disposition of the case,ms but did not
do so on the ground that Wade-Gilbert principles
.were inapplicable to pre-indictment identifications.
Rather, the Supreme Court distinguished the per-
missible pretrial identifications of Kirby from the
impermissible ones of Wade and Gilbert, because the
defendant in Kirby had been identified before the
initiation of any adversary judicial criminal pro-
ceedings against him.59 Inasmuch as defendant
Moore, in the instant case, had been identified at
a preliminary hearing which occurred before indict-
ment but after the initiation of adversary judicial
criminal proceedings, the Court held that Moore
had been entitled to the assistance of counsel under
Kirby. In so doing, the Court clarified and reaf-
firmed the point at which the right to counsel
attaches.
The lower courts' misapplication of the holdings
of Wade and Gilbert may also have arisen from the
lower courts' misunderstanding of another term
within those earlier Supreme Court opinions. In
Wade, the Court had held that "in-court" identifi-
ss Id See note 18 supra for a discussion of the standard
by which to determine harmless error.
56 "In the present case we are asked to extend the
Wade-Gilbert per se exclusionary rule to identification tes-
timony based upon a police station showup that took
place before the defendant had been indicted or otherwise
formally charged with any criminal offense." 406 U.S. at
684 (emphasis in original).
57 In People v. Kirby, 121 Ill. App. 2d 323, 257 N.E.2d
589 (1970), the Appellate Court of Illinois relied on a
state supreme court case, People v. Palmer, 41111. 2d 571,
244 N.E.2d 173 (1969), to hold that the Wade-Gilbert
principles apply only to post-indictment confrqntations.
58 406 U.S. at 691.
59 Id. at 689-90.
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cations of the accused need not be excluded when
the prosecution is able to establish that the identi-
fication is not based on observation of the accused
at an improper lineup.'m At the same time, the
Court had, under Gilbert, held that testimony con-
cerning improper pretrial identifications must be
excluded regardless of the source of the identifica-
tion.6" The test of which exclusionary rule was to
apply in a given situation depended upon whether
the testimony in question concerned an identifica-
tion made at trial or before trial-with the designa-
tion "in-court" employed to distinguish clearly
identifications made at trial from testimony at trial con-
cerning pretrial identifications. In Moore, the lower
courts did not distinguish between the two types of
identification testimony presented by the victim at
6o 388 U.S. at 239-40.
61 388 U.S. at 273. See also 434 U.S. at 227 and 388
U.S. at 220.
trial and thus admitted her entire testimony under
the Wade exception despite the fact that the victim's
testimony concerning the improper pretrial iden-
tification should clearly have been excluded under
the strict rule of Gilbert. While pointing out the
lower courts' error in this regard, the Supreme
Court reiterated the distinction between the types
of identification testimony and their attendant ex-
clusionary rules.
In sum, the Moore Court did not extend or alter
earlier Supreme Court holdings concerning pretrial
corporeal identifications. Rather, the Court simply
clarified its positions that, under Kirby, the accused
is entitled to the assistance of counsel at pretrial
corporeal identifications conducted after the initi-
ation of adversary judicial proceedings and that,
under Gilbert, prosecution testimony concerning im-
proper pretrial identifications is inadmissible re-
gardless of the basis of the identification.
